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ABSTRACT 
 
Exploring a Relationship between Intuition and Detection of Discrepancies. (May 2012) 
 
Talya Lazerus 
Department of Psychology 
Texas A&M University 
 
Research Advisor: Dr. Heather Lench 
Department of Psychology 
 
This paper discusses a possible link between visual discrepancy detection and intuitive 
processes. Intuitive processes are attributed to the experiential system, which is 
associated with affect and visual processing. Thus, intuition is predicted to enhance the 
ability to make connections on other tasks. Furthermore, past research has shown that 
sensing, the phenomenon in which a person may notice a change but not consciously 
perceive the change, and seeing, the phenomenon in which a person is consciously aware 
of a change and visually experiences it, rely on different processes. The sensing 
phenomenon, which seems related to intuitive processing, supports the conclusion that 
intuition is involved in detecting visual discrepancies. The literature supports the idea 
that people who are more intuitive and use more intuitive processes will be more 
accurate and faster at making connections on other tasks. Additionally, because intuition 
is affiliated with affect, it is predicted that people will be more accurate and faster when 
detecting social and emotional discrepancies than when detecting neutral discrepancies.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Psychological interest in intuition has flourished in the past few decades. Many 
researchers are trying to understand how intuitive processes work and how they 
influence decision-making processes. Kirkpatrick and Epstein (1992) proposed one of 
the leading explanations of intuition within the framework of cognitive-experimental 
self-theory (CEST). According to CEST, intuition is an unconscious, automatic process 
by which people accumulate and interpret information. The present study explored the 
relationship intuitive detection of perceptual and social discrepancies and the ability to 
identify connections on other tasks. Specifically, this investigation examined whether 
people who score high on the ability to detect discrepancies will score higher on tasks 
that require connections among concepts. The findings have implications for 
understanding unconscious processes, how those processes affect people's abilities, and 
the role that intuition plays in judgment and decision-making. Furthermore, the findings 
will have implications for other social sciences, such as economics and sociology, in 
understanding how people come to conclusions.   
 
 
_______________ 
This thesis follows the style of Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. 
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Recent dual process theories, including CEST, propose that information is processed by 
two systems that work in conjunction. The experiential system functions unconsciously, 
automatically, reactively, and rapidly processes information (Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 
1992; Epstein, 2008; Epstein, 1991; Kahneman, 2003; Morewedge, & Kahneman, 2010). 
It processes information in a manner that is nonverbal, holistic, concrete, effortless and 
reliant on affect (Epstein, 1990; Epstein, 2008; Kirkpatrick & Epstein, 1992). The 
experiential system is associated with activation in the limbic system (involved in 
emotional and sensory processing; Goleman, 1995). In contrast, the analytic system 
functions relatively consciously, analytically, deliberately, and slowly. It processes 
information in a manner that is verbal, abstract, logical, effortful and does not rely on 
emotion. Because the experiential system processes information more quickly than the 
analytic system, judgments derived from experiential processing occur before judgments 
that involve analytic processing (Kahneman, 2003). Largely uncontrollable, the 
experiential system makes minimal demands on cognitive resources (Epstein, 2008). 
 
Intuition is considered a product of the experiential system and thus intuitive reactions 
are characterized as tacit, automatic, unconscious, fast, and effortless (Epstein, 2008). 
Intuition does not include experiences in which a person can explain and articulate 
where his or her beliefs come from (Epstein, 2008). In other words, intuition is knowing 
without knowing how one knows. Intuition yields separate solutions than analytic 
thinking does because intuition is thought without analysis and uses implicit 
information, information that a person is not consciously aware of encoding. Intuition is 
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the ability to make fast, unconscious connections, allowing one to reach conclusions 
without conscious awareness of how one arrived there. In the intuitive process, the mind 
acquires information, unconsciously scans and analyzes it, and then connects point A to 
point B. Without introspection, a person is unaware that this process occurred. I posit 
that a stable individual difference in intuition exists, such that even in unfamiliar or new 
domains, an individual’s intuitive ability would remain constant.  
 
Currently, there are no well-established tests that measure intuition and intuitive 
processing. Individual differences in intuition are difficult to determine because 
measures would need to assess the use of subconscious, implicit thought processes. Tests 
in development include self-reports, measuring eye movement, and tracking 
physiological changes (Glöckner & Witteman, 2010). One of the more well-known self-
report measures is the Faith in Intuition (FI) scale by Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj, and 
Heier (1996), which evaluates people’s reliance on the experiential system and 
confidence in his or her own intuition. The FI scale may not be a reliable means of 
assessing individual differences in intuition because the scale only gathers people’s 
confidence and self-usage ratings, rather than actual performance.   
 
I propose that intuitive processing is reflected in the ability to detect perceptual and 
social discrepancies. Detecting discrepancies involves becoming aware of a change in 
your environment and can promote safety or social connectivity. Discrepancies can take 
several forms including perceptual (e.g., noticing the traffic light change from green to 
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yellow) or social (e.g., noticing a brief frown on the face of a friend). It is likely that 
intuition, and experiential processing more generally, reflects discrepancy detection 
because the experiential system is often involved in the processing of holistic images. 
The experiential system has a relatively fast connection to sensory information and 
responds to concrete nonverbal images (Goleman, 1995; Epstein, 1991). Also, the 
experiential system typically encodes information as images (Epstein & Pacini, 2001). 
Further, visualization of events promotes biased choices similar to choices made with 
experiential processing (Epstein & Pacini, 2001). Also, people make judgments faster 
and more efficiently when viewing pictures compared to words, suggesting that 
experiential processing is involved in responses to images (Zajonc, 1980). Together, 
these findings suggest that experiential processes are critical to formulating reactions to 
images.  
 
Further evidence suggests that intuition in particular may be relevant to discrepancy 
detection because people often “feel” or sense a change before being able to verbalize 
the exact change. Ryan and Cohen (2004) tracked participants’ eye movements and 
discovered that eye movements indicated that participants noticed a change before they 
could consciously recognize the change (see also Galpin, Underwood, & Chapman, 
2008). People also self-report sensing changes before they can identify them. Rensink 
(2004) found that participants reported that they sensed changes in images before they 
could report the exact change. The difference between sensing and identifying 
discrepancies is further supported by neuropsychological findings that identifying a 
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change involves different perceptual and neural processes than sensing a change (Busch, 
Frund, & Herrmann, 2009). Additionally, behavioral data from a change blindness study 
indicated that people implicitly detect changes in emotional expressions, suggesting that 
intuitive processing is involved in this type of discrepancy detection (Khittle, Bauer, & 
Wall, 2009). 
 
There is also a possibility that discrepancy detection differs for social and nonsocial 
stimuli, in part because of the highly emotional nature of social stimuli that is likely to 
involve experiential processing. Specifically, the ability to detect discrepancies might be 
greater for social stimuli than nonsocial stimuli. Evidence suggests that people generally 
process social and emotional stimuli more quickly and efficiently than nonsocial neutral 
stimuli. In one study, participants detected when a change occurred in faces more easily 
than when a change occurred in house images, but they had trouble localizing which 
feature changed for the faces compared to houses (Wilford & Wells, 2010). Alpers and 
Gerdes (2007) found that people perceive emotionally significant visual stimuli prior to 
neutral stimuli. Emotional expression represents the most complex and important social 
stimuli that people process. Sato and Yoshikawa (2010) found that emotional 
significance was more important than facial characteristics for proficient detection of 
emotional expressions. These findings demonstrate that people process emotionally 
significant stimuli faster and more adeptly than neutral stimuli, indicating that people 
might be better able to detect social and emotional discrepancies than neutral 
discrepancies.  
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The present study investigated the relationships among individual differences in 
intuition, as reflected in the ability to detect perceptual and social discrepancies, and 
performance on tasks that require connections among concepts. Based on previous 
findings that people sense discrepancies before they can identify the change, I 
hypothesized: 1) that people using intuitive processing to detect discrepancies will 
perform better on tasks that require connections among concepts, and 2) social 
discrepancies will be detected faster and more accurately than nonsocial discrepancies. I 
will also investigate whether differences exist between the accuracy and speed of 
identifying changes in the three facial features (mouth, browns, and eyes) and changes in 
five facial expressions (angry, disgusted, happy, sad, and scared).  
 
This investigation has important implications for understanding what comprises 
“intuition” and has the potential to identify one skill that is associated with intuitive 
processing. This study could also help explain how people process both social and 
perceptual discrepancies as well as lead to a greater understanding of unconscious 
processes.   
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CHAPTER II 
METHODS 
 
Participants 
Participants were 126 undergraduate students (73.8% female, M age = 18.90 years, SD = 
2.76, 7.1% were Asian, 0.8% were Black/African American, 19.8% were Hispanic, 
69.0% were White, 1.6% represented other ethnic groups, 2 participants were 
unreported).  Participants received course credits for their introductory psychology 
course.  Data from 64 participants was not reported for the Dyads of Triads task and for 
the Waterloo Gestalt Closure task due to computer error.  
 
Materials and procedure  
Demographics questionnaire 
Participants reported basic information, including sex, age, current academic standing, 
ethnicity, current GPA, high school GPA, and ACT and/or SAT score. 
 
Dyads of Triads 
The Dyads of Triads task (DOT) was used as measure of the ability to make connections 
among concepts. The DOT task consists of 20 dyads of groups, each group comprised of 
three words (Bowers, Regehr, Balthazard, & Parker, 1990). One group from each dyad 
contained three words that were semantically associated with a fourth word that was not 
presented. This group is “coherent,” in the sense that the words are related. The other 
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group represents an incoherent triad, with the three words not semantically associated 
with a fourth word. For example, one group included goat, pass, and green and the other 
group included bird, pipe, and road. Goat, pass, and green are all associated to the word 
mountain, whereas bird, pipe, and road have no similar associated word. The coherent 
and incoherent triads were counterbalanced so that they alternated in the left and right 
positions.  
 
Participants completed 20 trials of the DOT task. Each trial consisted of a dyad and was 
displayed for twelve seconds. Afterwards, participants were instructed to choose the 
group that they believed was semantically associated to a fourth word. They also rated 
their confidence regarding their choice on a scale, ranging from not very confident (1) to 
very confident (5), and if able, identified the semantically related word or concept. 
Figure 1 illustrates an example trial. 
 
The Waterloo Gestalt Closure Task  
The Waterloo Gestalt Closure Task was also used as a measure of the ability to make 
connections among concepts. The Waterloo Gestalt Closure Task consists of drawn 
images that are either meaningful in nature, representing a real object, such as a camel, 
or meaningless, representing an abstract design, such as a grouping of random lines 
(Bowers et al., 1990). Each meaningful item was paired with a meaningless item to 
create a trial set. Participants completed 20 trials of the Waterloo Gestalt Closure task, 
and each trial was presented for five seconds. Participants were instructed to identify 
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which image represented an actual object. They also rated their confidence regarding 
their choice on a scale, ranging from not very confident (1) to very confident (5), and if 
able, named the object. Figure 2 depicts an example trial.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. An example of a DOT word trial.  
Note. From “Intuition in the Context of Discovery” by Bowers et al., 1990, Cognitive Psychology, 22 
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Figure 2. An example of a Waterloo Gestalt Closure task trial. 
Note. From “Intuition in the Context of Discovery” by Bowers et al., 1990, Cognitive Psychology, 22 
 
 
 
Picture discrimination task 
The picture discrimination task was used to measure of individual differences in 
intuition, reflected as participants’ ability to detect discrepancies. In the task, images 
were presented in a flashing sequence, known as a flicker paradigm, in which an original 
image (A) alternated with its modified version (A’) in a pattern of A, A, A’, A’, A, A, 
A’, A’, … and so on; the modified version of each image contained only a single change. 
Each image was shown for 240 milliseconds and automatically forwarded, with an 80 
millisecond blank gray field acting as an inter-stimulus interval between image 
presentations. For each trial, participants pressed the “Z” key when they sensed the 
change but could not name it. They indicated when they could verbally identify the 
change by pressing the “M” key. The image sequence continued for 30 seconds or until 
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the participant’s pressed the “M” key. Participants also reported the nature of the change 
for each trial. The order of scenes was randomized for each person, and participants 
viewed each scene pair only once. Reaction times were measured for both the “Z” key 
and “M” key responses.  
 
The picture discrimination task included stimuli from Rensink (2004) that depict 
nonsocial scenes (e.g., a statue; a market scene) and newly created stimuli that depict 
social images of facial expressions in three-by-three picture grids. For the nonsocial 
scenes images, modifications either consisted of location, color, or presence of an object 
within the picture. For the social stimuli, pictures were taken of both a female model and 
a male model depicting neutral, happy, sad, angry, scared, and disgusted facial 
expressions. Three facial features (eyes, brows, and mouth) of each emotional 
expression were manipulated in Adobe Photoshop. The facial features were all 
individually blended onto the neutral expression of the models. A total of 30 new images 
were created, 15 per model, with one feature change per emotional expression (e.g. one 
new image consisted of the female neutral face with happy eyebrows). 
 
The neutral and manipulated images of facial expressions were placed into a three-by-
three picture grid (total of nine images). This was done in order to increase the 
complexity of the trials to match the complexity of the nonsocial trials. Each grid 
included images of the models, pictures of different people, and nonsocial scenes (e.g. 
shells in the sand; a tree by a pond). The neutral and manipulated facial expressions were 
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considered the target images, with the neutral expressions being the original images (A) 
and the manipulated expressions being the modified versions (A’). For example, in the 
first picture grid, the target image displayed the neutral expression of one of the models. 
In the second picture grid, a manipulated image of the same model was shown instead of 
the neutral expression (e.g., a neutral expression of the female model is shown first, then 
the same neutral expression of the female model with her eyes from the sad expression is 
shown).  
 
The task consisted of 59 trials. Twenty-three of the trials were nonsocial images, with 
five of the trials being catch trials with no change. Thirty-six of the trials were the social 
image picture grids, with 30 of the trials containing models’ facial expression changes, 
three consisting of changes that did not include the models’ pictures, and three trials 
having no changes serving as catch trials. Figures 3 and 4 depict a nonsocial trial and 
social trial, respectively. 
 
Images were presented on Dell Inspiron 570 desktop computers. Each nonsocial image 
from the picture discrimination task was at 700 X 500 pixels with a 16-bit color depth. 
Each social image picture grid from the picture discrimination task was at 700 X 700 
pixels with a 16-bit color depth. The individual images in the grid were at 233 X 233 
pixels. The experiments were implemented using MediaLab and DirectRT.  
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Participants were tested on individual computers in cubicles in groups of up to five. 
Participants first completed the Dyads of Triads task, the Waterloo Gestalt Closure Task, 
and then the picture discrimination task. They then completed a demographics 
questionnaire. All measures and tasks took place on the computers and participant 
responses were recorded by the computers. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. An example of a nonsocial image trial sequence in the picture discrimination task. 
Note. From “Visual Sensing Without Seeing” by Rensink, 2004, Psychological Science, 15. p. 28 
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Figure 4. An example of a social image picture grid in the picture discrimination task. 
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CHAPTER III 
RESULTS 
 
Preliminary coding and analysis 
Participants were divided into two groups based on their false alarm rates in the social 
scene trials. Participants who had a false alarm rate higher than 50% were classified as 
guessers (19.8%), while all other participants were considered non-guessers (80.2%). 
Analyses focus only on non-guessers because the results of guessers are not interpretable 
(Rensink, 2004). 
 
Participants were classified as intuitive or non-intuitive based on performance during the 
picture discrimination task. Each of the 30 trials were coded as either Alpha or Beta 
trials (Rensink, 2004).  Alpha trials were trials in which the time between the “see” 
response and the “sense” response was less than 1 second, indicating that little to no 
sensing had occurred during these trials. Beta trials were trials in which sensing occurred 
more than 1 second before seeing. Participants who had a low percentage (< 5%) of Beta 
trials were considered to be non-intuitive (50%), all other participants were considered to 
be intuitive (50%). Intuition classification was determined by the social scene trials, 
unless otherwise noted. 
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Accuracy and speed of intuitive versus non-intuitive participants 
I first examined whether there were differences in the proportion of changes in the 
picture discrimination task accurately identified by intuitive versus non-intuitive 
participants. There were no significant differences in accuracy between intuitive and 
non-intuitive participants on the social and nonsocial trials, all p’s > .232. Participants 
were equally accurate regardless of whether they sensed changes before seeing them. 
Intuitive participants (M =6.98, SD = 1.86) were faster at seeing changes in the 
nonsocial scenes compared to non-intuitive participants (M =7.84, SD = 2.07), t(85) = 
2.04, p = .045, d = 0.44. There were no significant differences between intuitive and 
non-intuitive participants in the amount of time taken to see changes in the social scenes.  
 
Next, I explored whether intuitive classification predicted accuracy on other tasks that 
require connections among concepts. As predicted, participants classified as intuitive 
were more accurate at identifying the coherent triads in the DOT task (M =15.48, SD = 
1.91) than non-intuitive participants (M =14.29, SD = 2.05), t(42) = 1.95, p = .058, d = 
0.60. Similar results were found for identifying the meaningful items in the Waterloo 
Gestalt Closure Task, however the effect did not reach statistical significance. Intuitive 
participants tended to be more accurate at selecting the meaningful images (M = 14.48, 
SD = 2.08) than non-intuitive participants (M = 13.29, SD = 2.82), t(42) = 1.60, p = .11, 
d = 0.49. Intuitive classification based on nonsocial trials did not relate to accuracy on 
other tasks, all p’s > .18.  There were no significant differences in time taken by intuitive 
and non-intuitive participants to choose which word triads were coherent. There were 
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also no significant differences between intuitive and non-intuitive participants in time 
spent choosing which images were meaningful.    
 
Change detection in nonsocial and social trials 
Overall, participants were more accurate at detecting changes in the nonsocial trials (M 
= .74, SD = .15) than in the social trials (M = .48, SD = .19) during the picture 
discrimination task, t(109) = 12.37, p < .001, d = 2.37. Participants were also faster at 
sensing changes in the nonsocial trials (M = 8.24, SD = 4.51) than in the social trials (M 
= 10.71, SD = 4.36), t(64) = 4.72, p < .001, d = 1.18. The same was true for seeing 
changes, with participants seeing changes in nonsocial trials faster (M = 7.42, SD = 2.00) 
than in social trials (M = 10.16, SD = 2.63), t(108) = 8.88,  p < .001, d = 1.71. 
 
Ability to detect changes in facial features 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect of facial feature type (brow, eye, 
mouth) on sensing reaction times, F(2, 94) = 6.56, p = .002. As shown in Table 1, 
participants were slower at sensing changes in the brows compared to changes in the 
eyes, t(55) = 1.71, p = .08, d = 0.46, or the mouth, t(48) = 3.54, p = .001, d = 1.02. 
Participants were also slower at sensing changes in the eyes compared to changes in the 
mouth, t(55) = 1.73, p = .09, d = 0.47. Thus, overall, participants were the slowest at 
sensing changes in the brows and fastest at sensing changes in the mouth. 
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A similar ANOVA revealed a main effect for facial feature type on seeing reaction 
times, F(2, 196) = 13.14, p < .001. As shown in Table 1, participants were again slower 
at seeing changes in the brows compared to changes in the eyes, t(100) = 2.23, p = .03, d 
= 0.45, or the mouth, t(99) = 4.32, p < .001, d = 0.87. Participants were also slower at 
seeing changes in the eyes compared to changes in the mouth, t(112) = 2.47, p = .02, d = 
0.47. Thus, again, participants were the slowest at seeing changes in the brows and 
fastest at seeing changes in the mouth. 
 
 
Table 1 
Sensing and Seeing Times for Facial Features  
 
             Sensing   Seeing     
              M        (SD)        M  (SD)   
 
Brow         11.26       (4.64)    10.90 (3.89)  
Eye           9.94       (3.70)    10.04 (2.60)  
Mouth           7.97       (3.82)      9.03 (2.57)  
 
 
 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA demonstrated a main effect for facial feature type on the 
accuracy of identifying changes in faces, F(2, 236) = 152.52, p < .001. As displayed in 
Table 2, participants were less accurate at identifying changes in the brows compared to 
changes in the mouth, t(118) =13.13, p < .001, d = 2.42, or the eyes, t(118) = 17.17, p < 
.001, d = 3.16. Participants were also less accurate at identifying changes in the mouth 
compared to changes in the eyes, t(120) =4.09, p < .001, d = 0.75. Altogether, 
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participants were the least accurate at identifying a change when it occurred in the brows 
and were the most accurate at identifying a change when it occurred in the eyes.  
 
 
Table 2  
Accuracy of Identifying Changes in Facial Features  
 
               M        (SD)  
 
Brow          0.27       (0.21)  
Eye          0.64       (0.25)  
Mouth          0.54       (0.20)  
 
 
 
 
I also examined whether intuition impacted detection and accuracy of identifying 
changes in different facial features. Intuitive participants were faster at sensing changes 
in the brows (M = 11.46, SD = 4.58) compared to non-intuitive participants (M = 15.44, 
SD = 6.65), t(18.97) = 2.14, p = .045, d = 0.98. There were no significant differences 
between intuitive and non-intuitive participants in sensing changes in the eyes and in the 
mouth. There were also no significant differences between intuitive and non-intuitive 
participants in seeing changes in the different facial features. Intuitive participants (M = 
0.59, SD = 0.19) were more accurate at identifying changes that occurred in the mouth 
compared to non-intuitive participants (M = 0.49, SD = 0.23), t(94) = 2.16, p = .033, d = 
0.45. There were no significant differences in the accuracy of identifying changes 
occurring in the eyes or brows between the two groups. 
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Ability to detect changes in facial expressions 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for facial expression type (angry, 
disgust, happy, sad, scared) on sensing times, F(4, 96) = 3.43, p = .012. As shown in 
Table 3, there was no significant difference in time to sense changes in angry and sad 
faces, t(31) = 0.24, p = .812, d = 0.09. There were also no significant differences in time 
to sense changes in disgusted, happy, and scared faces, all t’s ≤ 1.48, all p’s ≥ .147. 
There were significant differences in sensing changes in angry and sad faces compared 
to disgusted, happy, and scared faces, all t’s ≥ 2.48, all p’s ≤ .018, with one exception of 
sensing changes in sad faces compared to scared faces, which was not statistically 
significant, t(35) = 1.63, p = .112, d = 0.55. Thus, overall, participants were slower at 
sensing changes in angry and sad faces compared to disgusted, happy, and scared faces. 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a main effect for facial expression on time to see 
changes, F(4, 324) = 12.96, p < .001. As shown in Table 3, there was no significant 
difference in time to see changes in angry and sad faces, t(84) = 0.18, p = .859, d = 0.04. 
There were also no significant differences in time to see changes in disgusted, happy, 
and scared faces, all t’s ≤ 1.49, all p’s ≥ .140. There were significant differences in 
seeing changes in angry and sad faces compared to disgusted, happy, and scared faces, 
all t’s ≥ 3.35, all p’s ≤ .001. Thus, overall, participants were slower at seeing changes in 
angry and sad faces compared to disgusted, happy, and scared faces. 
 
 
 
 
  21 
Table 3 
Sensing and Seeing Times for Facial Expressions  
 
        Sensing    Seeing   
              M        (SD)        M   (SD)    
 
Angry         10.71       (5.44)     11.04 (4.01)  
Disgust           7.73       (2.79)      9.08 (3.36)  
Happy           8.48       (3.15)      9.34 (2.73) 
Sad         10.98       (4.59)    11.31 (4.11) 
Scared           8.62       (4.49)      8.63 (2.97)  
 
 
A repeated measures ANOVA demonstrated a main effect for facial expression type on 
the accuracy of identifying changes in the faces, F(4, 460) = 77.48, p < .001. As 
displayed in Table 4, there was no significant difference in the accuracy of identifying 
changes in angry and sad faces, t(117) = 1.25 p = .213, d = 0.23. There were also no 
significant differences in the accuracy of identifying changes in disgusted, happy, and 
scared faces, all t’s ≤ 0.764, all p’s ≥ .446. There were significant differences in the 
accuracy of identifying changes in angry and sad faces compared to disgusted, happy, 
and scared faces, all t’s ≥ 9.624, all p’s ≤ .001. Thus, overall, participants were less 
accurate at identifying changes in angry and sad faces compared to disgusted, happy, and 
scared faces 
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Table 4  
Accuracy of Identifying Changes in Facial Expressions  
 
               M        (SD)  
 
Angry          0.33       (0.29)  
Disgust          0.59       (0.26)  
Happy          0.60       (0.22) 
Sad   0.30       (0.25) 
Scared   0.61       (0.20) 
 
 
I also examined whether intuition impacted detection and accuracy of identifying 
changes in the different facial expressions. Intuitive participants were faster at sensing 
changes in sad faces (M = 10.72, SD = 4.78) compared to non-intuitive participants (M = 
17.38, SD = 5.71), t(35) = 2.83, p = .008, d = 0.96; however, this is a small sample size. 
Non-intuitive participants were marginally more likely to sense changes faster in disgust 
faces (M = 6.45, SD = 4.32) compared to intuitive participants (M = 9.06, SD = 4.16), 
t(47) = 1.69, p = .098, d = 0.49; however, this too was a small sample size. There were 
also no significant differences between intuitive and non-intuitive participants in seeing 
changes in the different facial expressions. Intuitive participants were more accurate (M 
=0.69, SD = 0.17) than non-intuitive participants (M =0.61, SD = 0.24) at identifying 
changes that occurred in the happy faces, t(92) = 1.98, p = .051, d = 0.41. There were no 
significant differences in the accuracy of identifying changes occurring in the other four 
facial expressions between the two groups. 
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CHAPTER IV 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present study investigated whether intuitive ability, reflected as detection of visual 
discrepancies, impacts performance on other tasks that require connections among 
concepts. This study also examined whether there would be a difference in the detection 
of discrepancies in various facial features and expressions. Results suggest that intuitive 
discrepancy detection predicts performance on tasks that require connections among 
concepts.  
 
Intuitive processing and ability to connect concepts 
I hypothesized that people who use intuitive processing to detect discrepancies would 
perform better on tasks that require the connection of concepts than those not using 
intuitive processing. This was tested by examining the accuracy and speed of 
discrepancy detection, the ability to identify coherent word sets, and the ability to 
identify coherent images. The findings were not fully consistent with the hypothesis for 
detection of discrepancies. Intuitive processing did not predict higher accuracy of 
detecting discrepancies. Also, a reliance on intuitive processing did not correspond to 
faster seeing times in the social scene discrepancies, though intuitive processing was 
associated with faster seeing times in the nonsocial scene discrepancies. The results 
illustrate that intuitive processing may not enhance accuracy in visual detection tasks 
and, more generally, that sensing is not crucial for correctly identifying changes.  
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One explanation for why intuitive processing was related to faster seeing times in 
nonsocial scenes, though not on the social scenes, may depend on the complexity of the 
different scene types. The nonsocial trials each consisted of one large image, with many 
potential change locations, whereas the social trials each consisted of nine images, also 
with many possible change locations. During the social trials, participants might have 
been more distracted in their visual search compared to in the nonsocial trials, up to the 
point that individual differences in intuitive processing would not have been exhibited. 
The nonsocial images would have less visual interference, thus differences between 
intuitive and non-intuitive participants might have been evident.  
 
In the DOT task, intuitive participants were more accurate than non-intuitive participants 
at identifying the coherent triads. Also, while not significant, intuitive participants were 
more accurate at identifying the meaningful images in the Waterloo Gestalt Closure task 
compared to non-intuitive participants. There were no significant differences in the 
amount of time intuitive and non-intuitive participants took to choose which triad was 
coherent and which image was meaningful.  
 
Detection of discrepancies offers a potentially useful measure of intuitive ability by 
presenting a way to assess unconscious processes that are usually difficult to evaluate. 
People sense changes before becoming consciously aware of the changes, indicating that 
detection of discrepancies involves unconscious processing (Galpin, Underwood, & 
Chapman, 2008; Ryan & Cohen, 2004).  People who sense and see changes faster 
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demonstrate greater reliance on intuitive processing when detecting discrepancies. And 
while intuitive processing (based on the social task) did not correspond to higher 
accuracy in the picture discrimination task, it did with the DOT task and Waterloo 
Gestalt Closure task. Thus, by calculating discrepancy detection times of individuals, the 
amount of intuitive processing utilized can assess intuitive ability in tasks that require 
connections among concepts. 
 
Furthermore, intuition can be thought of in terms of a spreading activation model of 
cognition (Collins & Loftus, 1975; Ross & Bower, 1981). Intuitive processing may 
activate a wide variety of nodes in a holistic manner, connecting and spreading outward, 
whereas analytical processing has a narrower range of activation. Similar models have 
been proposed for creativity (Isen, Daubman, & Nowicki, 1987; Isen, Labroo,& Durlack, 
2004). People who are high in intuitive ability are more likely to have a wider variety of 
connections available and also have connections that are more readily activated than 
people who are low in intuitive ability, and this difference is likely to be reflected on 
tasks that require application of wide connections such as a discrepancy detection task. 
In the DOT task, participants must make connections among concepts. Within the 
framework of this theory, intuitive participants would have an easier time concluding 
which triad is coherent compared to non-intuitive participants due to enhanced spreading 
activation. Intuitive participants would have a greater variety of words connected with 
each other, as well as having those connections easily triggered, which would increase 
the chances of them activating the correct node of the corresponding associated word. 
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Thus, intuitive participants would be more accurate at choosing the coherent triad 
compared to non-intuitive participants who have limited networks of connection. In the 
Waterloo Gestalt Closure task, participants must make connections about concepts in a 
visual manner, matching images with others in their memory. Intuitive participants 
would have an easier time identifying the meaningful images than non-intuitive 
participants because intuitive individuals would have a wider variety of images 
connected to each other, as well as having those connections be more readily accessible. 
These network characteristics would magnify the number of nodes activated and 
comparisons made, increasing the likelihood of the intuitive participants activating the 
correct node and identifying the correct image. Thus, intuitive participants would be 
more accurate at choosing the meaningful image compared to non-intuitive participants.  
 
Detection of social and nonsocial discrepancies 
I predicted that participants would detect social discrepancies faster and more accurately 
than nonsocial discrepancies. This prediction was not observed. Participants detected 
(sensing and seeing) nonsocial discrepancies faster than social discrepancies and were 
more accurate at detecting nonsocial discrepancies than social ones. As previously 
suggested, the higher complexity of the social scenes may have factored into the 
differences of accuracy and detection times between the social and nonsocial trials. 
Lowering the complexity of the social scenes, such using a 2X2 grid rather than a 3X3 
grid, may be more suitable for comparing and analyzing the accuracy and detection 
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times of social and nonsocial discrepancies. In addition, standardizing the complexity of 
both types of scenes would be useful in future investigations. 
 
Change detection of facial features 
I also examined accuracy and detection in relation to the different facial features. 
Overall, participants were the slowest at sensing changes in the brows and the fastest at 
sensing changes in the mouth. Paralleling these findings, participants were the slowest at 
seeing changes in the brows and the fastest at seeing changes in the mouth. Similarly, 
participants were the least accurate at identifying that a change occurred when it 
happened in the brows, though they were the most accurate at identifying a change when 
it occurred in the eyes. Analyzing whether intuitive processing influenced accuracy and 
speed of detecting facial feature changes revealed that intuitive participants were more 
accurate at identifying changes in the mouth, as well as faster at sensing changes in the 
brow, compared to non-intuitive participants. There were no differences in seeing 
changes in the facial features between intuitive and non-intuitive participants.  
 
The higher accuracy in detecting changes in the eyes compared to the brows and mouth 
is compatible with previous research that has shown that people attend to the eyes more 
than the mouth (Davies & Hoffman, 2002). Why, then, were changes in the eyes not 
sensed and seen quicker than changes in the mouth when changes in the eyes were more 
accurately identified? Possible reasons for this occurrence are that 1) the mouth covers a 
larger area than the eyes, and thus is easier to sense and see, and 2) because the eyes 
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were presented without the normal corresponding brow movement, changes in the eyes 
were harder to detect than in natural facial expressions in which the eyes and brows shift 
together. The lack of differences in seeing changes in facial features between intuitive 
and non-intuitive participants suggests that sensing does not facilitate seeing. 
 
Change detection of facial expressions 
I was also interested in accuracy and detection of the different facial expressions. 
Participants were slower at detecting (sensing and seeing) changes in angry and sad 
faces compared to disgusted, happy, and scared faces. They were also less accurate at 
identifying changes when the changes occurred in angry and sad faces compared to in 
disgusted, happy, and scared faces. Compared to non-intuitive participants, intuitive 
participants were faster at sensing changes in sad faces. Intuitive participants were also 
more accurate at identifying changes in happy faces compared to non-intuitive 
participants. Interestingly, non-intuitive participants were marginally more likely to 
sense changes faster in disgusted faces compared to intuitive participants. There were no 
significant differences in seeing changes in the different facial expressions between 
intuitive and non-intuitive participants. As previously discussed, this may indicate that 
sensing does not promote seeing. 
 
Recent research has found that observers detect the change of a male neutral face to a 
male angry face more rapidly than the change of a male neutral faces to either a fearful 
or happy male face (Amado, Yildirim, & Turkey, 2011). The present findings indicate an 
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opposing conclusion: a change from a neutral to a happy face is detected faster than a 
change from a neutral to an angry face. Becker et al. (2012) found similar results in 
which participants detected a change to a happy more rapidly than a change to an angry 
face. One caveat of the current study is that in the picture discrimination task, features 
were individually changed to display the emotional expression, rather than the whole 
expression being manifested. 
 
An evolutionary perspective may account for the clustering of the responses to angry and 
sad faces and disgusted, happy, and scared faces. Evolutionarily, emotions have adaptive 
functions, and emotional expressions are a form of communication, indicating intent, 
behavior to follow, and potential danger (Greenberg, 2002; Keltner & Gross, 1999). 
Disgust signals possible contamination, such as in a food source (Teachman, 2006). 
Aggression and anger warns other members of the group that an attack may occur, 
whereas fear corresponds with the intention of flight and escape, preparing others to flee 
(Greenberg, 2002; Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009).  Happiness may motivate an individual to 
remain on his or her current path or indicate friendship; while sadness can prompt calls 
for help or signal that efforts are ineffective (Nesse & Ellsworth, 2009; Ohman, 2009).  
Fear and disgusted expressions indicate imminent danger from environmental factors 
and a happy expression signals safety of the surrounding environment, whereas angry 
and sad expressions communicate conflict within the social group. Expressions related to 
external factors might prompt faster reactions than expressions related to conflict within 
a group.  
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Limitations 
The present study has several limitations. First, even though the models used are actors 
and were chosen based on their emotional expressiveness, some may argue that the 
emotions displayed by the actors are not “true” emotions because the emotions were not 
elicited in real situations. Also, for the picture discrimination task, because only one 
facial feature was altered at a time per emotional expression, the results found may not 
correspond to responses gathered by changing all the facial features. Furthermore, others 
may question whether the Dyads of Triads task and the picture discrimination task 
actually measured intuition performance. However, both tasks were designed to have 
participants make quick, intuitive judgments, and accuracy in both tasks was associated 
with higher use of intuitive processing. Thus, the Dyads of Triads task and the picture 
discrimination task most likely measured intuitive performance. 
 
Conclusions 
The findings contribute to the growing body of work that investigates how intuitive 
processing works and how intuitive processing may be measured. Also, this study begins 
to tease apart how people respond to quick changes in facial expressions, including 
which features and which emotions are detected most quickly and accurately.  
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